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We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and 
Indonesian students. Our results suggest that although both subject pools show a high level 
of concern with the extent of corruption in Indonesia, the Indonesian public servant 
subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. 
We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the public 
servants for either engaging in or not engaging in corruption suggest that the differences in 
behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For 
example, when abstaining from corruption public servants more often cite the need to 
reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in 
corruption they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil 
in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We 
conclude by arguing that experiments such as the one considered in this paper can be used 
to measure forward-looking attitudinal change in society and that results obtained from 
different subject pools can complement each other in the determination of such attitudinal 
changes. 
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  This paper compares the behavior of Indonesian public servants with the behavior 
of Indonesian students in a corruption experiment. It builds on Cameron et al., (2006), 
where we used an experimental design to explore whether there are systematic cultural 
differences in the propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior, and found that 
student subjects in Indonesia are less tolerant of corruption than student subjects in India, 
Singapore, and Australia.
3 In this paper we explore to what extent the low tolerance level 
of the students in Indonesia is shared by the public servants in Indonesia.  
The experiment that we report in this paper can be classified as both an 
“artefactual” and a “framed” field experiment according to the taxonomy developed by 
Harrison and List (2004).
4 There has been a tradition in experimental economics of relying 
on non-emotive neutral language in experiments. However, evidence is beginning to gather 
that providing a context for the experiment might be desirable, especially in cases when the 
participants have a direct experience with the particular context being studied. For 
example, both Cooper et al., (1999) and Harrison and List (2005) find that introducing a 
context that expert subject pools recognize from their past experiences triggers an 
                                                 
3 The results in Cameron et al., (2006) are consistent with the outcome of the surveys conducted by 
Transparency International in 44 countries which showed that Indonesians were the most optimistic about 
future corruption reduction while Indians were amongst the most pessimistic. See 
unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN016537.pdf. The World Bank’s “voice 
and accountability” index also puts Indonesia among those countries that have achieved a sharp improvement 
in corruption reduction since 1996 (Kaufman, 2005). 
4 That is, we examine behavior using a non-standard subject pool and explicitly introduce context from the 
field to the laboratory experiment by using loaded language and roles specific to the context. Harrison and 
List (2004) classify all experiments into four categories: conventional lab experiments, (that employ a 
standard subject pool of students, an abstract framing, and an imposed set of rules); artefactual field 
experiments (same as conventional lab experiments but with a non-standard subject pool),  framed field 
experiments (same as artefactual field experiments but with field context in either the commodity, task, or 
information set that the subjects can use), and natural field experiments  (same as a framed field experiment 
but where the environment is one where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects 
do not know that they are in an experiment).   3
application of learning from those past experiences.
5 Hence, depending on the issue under 
study, framed experiments might better capture true preferences or attitudes (Cooper et al., 
1999; Cooper and Kagel, 2003; Harrison and List, 2004). 
A framed experiment allows us to analyse both the behavioral differences between 
the public servant and student subjects, and the reasons for these differences. The use of 
public office for private gain is seen as an important source of corruption in many 
developing countries.
6 Hence, the blame for corruption in developing countries is often 
laid at the feet of corrupt public servants. This conventional wisdom leads one to expect 
the public servant subjects in Indonesia to be more tolerant of corruption than the student 
subjects in Indonesia.  
The differences in behavior may be due to an experience effect if the differing 
experiences of the two groups lead to the adoption of different norms of behavior. 
Indonesian public servants are frequently exposed to corruption in their workplace
7 while 
Indonesian students’ exposure to corruption is possibly more limited and indirect. Hence, 
an experience effect would be present if a high exposure to corruption in the public service 
leads public servants to adopt a more tolerant norm of corrupt behavior, the difficulty of 
living on low salaries makes them more susceptible to the temptation of corruption, or a 
more direct exposure to corruption and its costs increases their aversion to it. Alternatively, 
the differences in behavior may be driven by a selection effect if those who choose to join 
                                                 
5 This is consistent with the findings in cognitive psychology, See, as cited in Cooper et al., (1999), Gick and 
Holyoak (1980), Perkins and Salomon (1988), and Salomon and Perkins (1989). 
6 See, for example, the World Bank’s analysis and anti-corruption initiative at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EX
TANTICORRUPTION/0,,contentMDK:20222047~menuPK:384461~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSite
PK:384455,00.html. See also the discussion in Bardhan (2006).   
7 Indonesia is currently ranked by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world (with a ranking of 137 among the 158 countries ranked). See 
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.    4
the public service are inherently more or less corrupt than those who are attracted to the 
private sector.  
The extent of differences in behavior across subject pools has been of considerable 
methodological interest to experimental economists. The literature that has sought to 
examine subject pool effects has largely explored gender and educational differences 
amongst students.
8 Recently there has been an increase in the use of non-standard subject 
pools in experiments.
9 The results on whether the subject pool matters are mixed. Carbone 
(2005), for example, finds very little effect of demographics on behavior in a life-cycle 
consumption experiment conducted on a random sample of the population. Kovalchik et 
al., (2005) find no effect of age on behavior in a variety of economic decision-making 
experiments. In contrast, Croson and Gneezy (2004) document a number of differences by 
gender. Alevy et al., (2006) find that financial market professionals outperform student 
subjects in experiments examining herd behavior in financial markets. Fehr and List (2004) 
find that CEOs exhibit considerably more trustful and trustworthy behavior than students. 
Finally, List (2003) finds that the experience of sportscard traders eliminates what is 
known as the endowment effect (that a good’s value increases once it becomes a part of an 
individual’s endowment). None of these papers explore subject pool effects in the case of a 
corruption experiment.  
Our findings reveal that the Indonesian public servants are substantially less likely 
to engage in corruption than the Indonesian students. This is in an environment where there 
                                                 
8 There has also been a focus on whether business and economics students (who make up a disproportionate 
share of the student subjects) differ from the other students. 
9 The non-standard subject pools used include financial market traders (Alevy et al., 2006), sportscard dealers 
(List, 2003; Harrison and List, 2005), nurses (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Barr et al., 2004), CEOs (Fehr and 
List, 2004), managers in Chinese state-owned enterprises (Cooper et al., 1999), public affairs officials 
(Potters and van Winden, 1996), and a random sample of the general population (Carbone, 2005). Only a 
subset of these studies directly compares the results from the non-standard subject pool with the results from 
the student subject pool.    5
were significant monetary gains to be made from acting corruptly and where, as we explain 
in the next section, we went to great lengths to ensure anonymity and distance from the 
workplace. The results further suggest that the difference in behavior is not driven by a 
selection effect, but is rather a consequence of experience in the public sector.  
  The results from both the public servant and student subject pools are consistent in 
that they show a high level of concern with the extent of corruption in Indonesia. That the 
results differ sharply by subject pool highlights the need to conduct experiments on either 
the relevant subject pool or across a number of different subject types. In the context of a 
corruption experiment, experiments conducted with students as subjects are open to 
criticism on the basis that because students are likely to be idealistic and have little 
experience of the real world, their behavior and views may not reflect those of society at 
large. On the other hand, if regime change is driven from the grass roots, often with 
vigorous student involvement (as was the case in Indonesia in 1998), student attitudes 
might well be an appropriate gauge of a country’s future with regard to corruption. As far 
as the Indonesian public servants are concerned, since they are in a role in which they 
regularly have to decide whether to engage in, tolerate, or dissuade corrupt acts, their 
attitudes to corruption may be a more relevant, or at least an equally important, gauge of 
the extent and future of a country’s corruption problems.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the experimental 
design and procedure. Section 3 compares the results from the student pool with those 
from the public servant pool, and explores the reasons for the differences. Section 4 
concludes by offering an interpretation of our results and discussing their implications.  
   6
2.  Experimental Design and Procedures. 
2.1 Design 
  The experiment is based on the three-person, sequential-move game introduced in 
Cameron et al. (2006). It is intended to capture a typical and pervasive bribery problem in 
many developing countries, where, for example, the manager of a firm may offer a bribe to 
avoid complying with an environmental or a health regulation. Figure 1 contains an 
extensive-form representation of the game, where all of the payoffs are denoted in 
experimental dollars.  
  The players are denoted as the “Firm,” “Government Official,” and “Citizen.” They 
start with an endowment of 60, 30, and 80 experimental dollars respectively. The Firm 
moves first and must decide whether to offer a bribe to the Government Official, and if so, 
how much to offer. It can choose a bribe amount B ∈ [4,8]. It costs the Firm two 
experimental dollars to offer a bribe and the Firm incurs this transaction cost regardless of 
whether the bribe is accepted. If a bribe is offered, the Official can either accept or reject 
the bribe. Acceptance of the bribe implies favorable treatment of the Firm. It increases the 
payoffs of both the Firm and the Official by 3B, but decreases the payoff of the Citizen by 
7B.
10 As mentioned above, the payoff increase that the firm experiences may represent, for 
example, the benefit from avoiding a regulation. We assume that the bribery has a 
significant impact on society. This is captured by the large decrease in the Citizen’s payoff. 
                                                 
10 We assume that the Official’s payoff increases by 3B even though the amount of bribe paid by the Firm is 
B due to a difference in the marginal utility of income for the Firm and the Official. Since the income earned 
in the public service is likely to be lower than that earned in private firms, the same amount of money can be 
assumed to have a lower marginal utility value to the Firm than to the Official. Abbink, Irlenbusch and 
Renner (2002) make a similar assumption. This assumption also has the additional advantage of helping us 
prevent negative total payoffs.   7
  The Citizen observes the decisions made by the Firm and the Official and can 
punish them for the act of bribery by choosing an amount P ∈ [2,12] in penalty. 
Punishment is costly to the Citizen and reduces the Citizen’s payoff by the amount of the 
punishment, P. However, it imposes a monetary sanction on the Firm and Official by 
reducing their payoffs by 3P. Hence, the net benefit to the Firm and the Official from the 
corrupt transaction is 3B - 2 - 3P and 3B - 3P respectively. 
We have chosen to conduct a one-shot game because in a one-shot game the 
punishment has no economic benefit to the Citizen. Since the decision to punish is not 
affected by the anticipation of possible future economic gains, the Citizens’ willingness to 
punish helps us capture their tolerance of corruption more directly. In other words, the 
Citizens who choose to punish in a one-shot game would have even more incentive to 
punish in a multi-period game since by doing so, they can possibly deter corruption and 
decrease the harm they suffer. The one-shot nature of the game also helps us avoid the 
issues associated with repeated games, such as signaling, reputation formation, and serial 
correlation in decisions. 
We have also deliberately chosen to use emotive terms such as “bribe” and 
“punishment” in the instructions. As mentioned in the introduction, the use of a meaningful 
context might better capture behavior in field settings than the use of neutral language.
11 
Further, as discussed above, context may be an important element in revealing subject pool 
differences as they trigger considerations of participants’ own experiences which may 
differ across the different subject pools. Finally, as Harrison and List (2004) indicate, “it is 
                                                 
11 We ran both neutral-language and loaded language experiments with students in Australia to see whether 
the behavior in the loaded-language experiments is different from the behavior in the neutral-language 
experiments. We find that in the neutral-language sessions, the behavior is closer to the game theoretical 
prediction. That is, the subjects bribe more often, accept more often, and punish less often. These results 
indicate that the loaded-language experiment is able to capture the subjects’ tolerance of corruption.    8
not the case that abstract, context-free experiments provide more general findings if the 
context itself is relevant to the performance of subjects (p. 1022).” 
2.2 Procedure  
The experiments were run at the University of Indonesia and the Sekolah Tinggi 
Ilmu Administrasi (STIA), which is a training college for public servants. Both institutions 
are located in Jakarta. The student subject pool consisted of third-year undergraduate and 
postgraduate students. 180 student subjects and 147 public servant subjects participated in 
the experiments. Each subject participated only once and in only one role. Since each play 
of the game involves three subjects, this gives us 60 plays of the game (i.e., 60 independent 
observations) for the students and 49 for the public servants.  
All the sessions were run as non-computerized experiments. Each experimental 
session lasted about an hour. At the beginning of each session subjects were asked to come 
to a large lecture theatre. Each session consisted of at least 30 subjects. The subjects, on 
entering the room, were randomly designated as Firms, Officials, or Citizens. Each group 
was located apart from the others in a recognizable cluster. Thus, each group could see the 
members of the other groups, but individual subjects were unaware of which three specific 
subjects constituted a particular Firm-Official-Citizen trio and would not learn this 
information at any point during the session.  
  At the beginning of each session, each subject received a copy of the instructions, 
which were then read out loud to them. To avoid experimenter effects, the experiments 
were conducted by the same team of experimenters, which included an Indonesian 
researcher and an Indonesian research assistant. The subjects were given a number of 
examples explaining how the payoffs would be calculated for specific bribe and   9
punishment amounts. Then, the subjects playing the role of a Firm were asked to make 
their decisions. The record sheets with their bribe amounts were then collected and 
distributed by the experimenter to the corresponding Officials. After the Officials made 
their decisions, the corresponding Citizens were informed whether a bribe was offered and 
whether it was accepted. The experiment ended after the Citizens decided whether to 
punish or not. The decisions made by all of the subjects were entered into a spreadsheet 
which generated their payoffs. The subjects were paid at the end of each session after the 
payoffs were converted into cash. To guarantee parity in the payoffs to the different type of 
players (Firm, Official, and Citizen), we used a different conversion rate for each type. The 
conversion rates also took into account the differing income levels of the public servants 
and students.
 These conversion rates were public information.
  
Each student subject made on average US$8
12 in the experiment while each public 
servant subject made US$12. Hence, the average earning of the public servants was 1.525 
times higher than the average earning of the student subjects. The average hourly wage of 
the public servants, across all ranks and levels, is approximately equal to 55 US cents.
13 
Assuming that students would receive an amount close to the minimum wage if employed 
(which in Jakarta is equal to 31 US cents per hour), the average hourly wage of the public 
servants is approximately 1.77 times higher than that of the students. These figures imply 
that the average ratio of experimental earnings to actual hourly wages was approximately 
22% for the public servants and 26% for the students. In addition, the public servant 
subjects made decisions under reasonably high stakes as their average earnings in the 
experiment were approximately 22 times their average hourly wage rate.  
                                                 
12 This has approximately the same purchasing power as US$15-20 in the US. 
13 This figure was obtained from the website containing information on the determination of civil servant 
salaries in Indonesia. See http://www.pu.go.id/sekjen/biro%20hukum/perpres/perpres1_06.html.     10
  After the experiment, the subjects filled out a demographic survey, which asked 
them a series of questions regarding their age, gender, field of study, work experience, 
expenditure levels, religion, ethnicity, and level of exposure to corruption. They were also 
asked to explain the motivation for their decisions. The student subjects were additionally 
asked whether after graduating they wished to work in the private or public sector.
14  
  In designing the experiment, we were acutely aware of the need for anonymity - 
especially in the case of the public servants - between the subjects and the experimenters, 
and among the subjects themselves. Levitt and List (2006) model the choices made in 
experiments as being the outcome of two, possibly competing, forces: payoff maximization 
and non-pecuniary “moral” costs or benefits. The moral cost of a decision reflects the 
financial externality the decision imposes on others, social norms, and “scrutiny effects.” 
The scrutiny effects reflect the desire on the part of subjects to send a signal to the 
experimenter or be perceived by the experimenter in a certain way. Levitt and List (2006) 
argue that moral concerns are greater when an individual’s actions are more closely 
scrutinized and that the unnatural level of scrutiny in an experimental lab can bias the 
results away from what would be observed in the real world.
 15   
                                                 
14 The instruction, record, and survey sheets are available from the authors upon request. The documents 
were prepared in English, translated into Indonesian by a native Indonesian speaker, and then checked by 
both a native Indonesian speaker who is fluent in English and a native English speaker who can read 
Indonesian. 
15 Levitt and List (2006) cite people behaving differently in front of their children as one example of the 
scrutiny effect. The scrutiny effect is particularly problematic if one wishes to use the experimental results in 
a predictive manner. For example, having observed that a father does not cross a road against a red light in 
front of his children, one would not necessarily want to predict that he would not cross against red if on his 
own. However, in our context there is no supposition that the lab results are predictive in this sense. That is, 
we would not predict that a subject who does not engage in corruption in the lab will not be corrupt when 
faced with the realities of the real world, such as living on a low government salary. Rather, we take the 
differences in the lab results across the different subject pools as indicative of the differences in the 
underlying attitudes to or tolerance of corruption. In the context of the example given above, note that an 
observation that parents in congested urban areas are less likely to cross against a red light in front of their 
children than parents in sparsely populated rural areas is likely to contain information regarding the 
differences in the underlying attitudes - that urban parents view crossing with the green light as a more   11
  The concern in the context of our experiment is that the observed behavioral 
differences between the public servants and the students may be due to the presence of a 
more severe scrutiny effect amongst the public servants. We took a number of steps to 
reduce this possibility. First, we conducted the public servant experiments at the training 
college for public servants, STIA, rather than at a particular government ministry or 
somewhere closely associated with their place of work. STIA trains public servants from 
all across Indonesia. Our sample covered people from over 60 different ministries and 
government offices coming from as far as Aceh in the east to Papua in the west. The 
experiments were thus conducted far from the participants’ place of work. Second, the 
experiments with the public servants were conducted on a Saturday as part of a college 
festival and, hence, outside the normal study structure and not in the presence of any 
faculty or college employees. Third, we explained at the start of each session that the game 
was to be played anonymously. The participants were told that they would not know who 
they were matched with. The participants were assigned a code that was used to match the 
decisions of the different members of each group, to link their decisions with the answers 
in the surveys, and to make the payments. The researchers used an irreversible process 
whereby no record was retained of how the code related to the individuals. This was stated 
out loud and stressed several times at the start of each session. Fourth, to ensure privacy 
throughout the decision-making process, we made sure that the participants sat at a 
distance from each other that prevented their neighbours from seeing their decisions. Fifth, 
to reduce the probability that public servant subjects thought that we were interested in 
their behavior as public servants, we announced at the start of each session that we were 
                                                                                                                                                    
important safety lesson to instil in children than parents from the country. It is this kind of a comparative 
result that we seek in this paper.          12
conducting these experiments at a number of educational colleges around the country and 
the survey, which asked them about their reasons for acting as they did (which the subjects 
were only made aware of and received after they had made their decisions in the 
experiment), was deliberately structured to appear as though there was no focus on public 
servants. For example, it asked generally about work experience and whether they worked 




  We start our analysis by discussing the differences in the demographic variables for 
the student and public servant pools respectively. Table 1 presents the summary statistics. 
It shows that, as expected, the public servants were on average older than the students 
(with an average age of 30.5 as compared to 20.6) and had more work experience. 
Specifically, while the public servants had 8.5 years of work experience on average 
(ranging from 1 to 30 years), the students had fewer than 5 months. A larger proportion of 
the public servants were male (75% versus 42%) and Muslim (85% versus 66%). The 
public servants also came from a wider array of ethnic groups. Only 36% of them were 
from the dominant Javanese ethnic group as opposed to 49% of the students. Finally, as 
anticipated, the public servants had higher expenditure levels.
17  
  Table 1 also presents the subjects’ answers to questions about their contact with 
corruption. As anticipated, a much larger proportion of the public servants reported coming 
                                                 
16 It is also worth mentioning that in the post-experimental survey responses, none of the 147 public servants 
stated that their decisions were affected by any aspects of scrutiny.  
17 The expenditure level of the public servants was on average 2.2 times higher than that of the students. This 
is expected as the public servants are older and would have families to take care of. The higher expenditure 
levels of the public servants could also reflect the income levels of their spouses or other adults living in the 
household.    13
into contact with corruption through their work (55% versus 9%). Interestingly, the 
students and the public servants had similar amounts of exposure to corruption outside the 
workplace (reported by 33% of the students versus 32% of the public servants). The 
students more often reported coming into contact or hearing about corruption through 
family and friends or the mass media.  
  In summary, the students differed from the public servants in two important ways: 
(i) the students had a much more limited personal experience of corruption in the real 
world, and (ii) 81% of the students stated that they intend to work in the private sector after 
graduating. We control for the demographic variables presented in Table 1 in the statistical 
tests below. Moreover, we use the data from the student subjects who stated that they 
intend to work in the public sector to examine the extent to which the differences in 
behavior can be explained by selection effects.  
  Figure 2 shows the distribution of bribes for the student and public servant subject 
pools respectively. Table 2 presents summary statistics of behavior and t-tests of 
differences in means.
18 It shows that 78% of the student subjects in the role of the Firm 
chose to bribe while only 47% of the public servants chose to bribe. This is a large 
difference. As shown in Table 2, it is strongly statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.0005.
19 The students also offered larger bribes on average. The mean positive bribe 
amount was 7.3 for the students versus 6.7 for the public servants (p-value = 0.04).  
  Figure 3 shows the acceptance rates of participants in the role of the Government 
Official. Bribes were accepted 79% of the time by the student subjects and only 30.4% of 
                                                 
18 We also conducted non-parametric rank sum tests of differences in distribution.  The results are the same 
as the reported t-tests and are available from the authors upon request.  
19 47% is an extremely low bribery rate. For example, with the same experiment, the bribery rate was 89% 
among the Australian student subjects and 84% among the Singaporean student subjects (Cameron et. al., 
2006).   14
the time by the public servant subjects (p-value < 0.0001). The low bribery and acceptance 
rates of the public servants mean that there were very few public servants who got the 
opportunity to make a decision in the role of the Citizen. Of the 49 Citizen subjects, only 7 
had the opportunity to punish. Punishment behavior is represented in Figure 4. It shows 
that the punishment rate was higher amongst the public servants, again indicating a lower 
tolerance of corruption (71% versus 59%). However, this difference is not statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.56). This could be due to the small number of observations in the 
sample for public servants. 
  Table 3 presents the regression results that control for whether the participant is a 
public servant or a student (to capture the subject pool effect), male, from a rural area, 
Javanese, has experienced corruption in his/her workplace,
20 and whether a student intends 
to work in the public sector (to capture the selection effect). We chose to focus on these 
variables because they are the ones of interest in the existing literature and/or because they 
were the only ones that were statistically significant in any specification. Notably, 
controlling for the income and expenditure levels of the subjects in the regressions never 
yielded statistically significant results (and hence these variables are not included in the 
reported results). This leads us to conclude that the differences in the living standards and 
hence the differences in the “real” magnitude of the stakes across the different participants 
are not driving our results. In addition to the variables listed above, the regressions for the 
acceptance behavior also include a variable on the size of the bribe that was offered. Since 
the sample size for the punishment behavior of the public servants was too small to be 
meaningful, the results for the punishment behavior are not reported.
  
                                                 
20 As we discuss in Section 3.2 below, this is one of the four ways in which we seek to identify the effect of 
experience on behaviour.   15
  The coefficients on the public servant dummy are in every case statistically 
significant and consistent with the results of the t-tests. That is, the public servant subjects 
are significantly less likely to offer a bribe and less likely to accept a bribe. In cases when 
they did offer a bribe, the amount of the bribe was smaller. The results also reveal that 
being male has a significant effect only on the propensity to bribe.
21 Moreover, being from 
Java is associated with a lower probability of offering a bribe.  
  Columns 7-8 in Table 3 present a second set of results for the acceptance behavior 
which allow the effect of the amount of the bribe to vary with whether the subject is a 
student or a public servant. These show that students differ from public servant subjects in 
the way they react to the bribe amount. While the acceptance behavior of the public 
servants is unaffected by the bribe amount, the students show a higher willingness to 
accept a bribe when the bribe amount is higher.  
  Having considered the differences between the two subject pools, we now turn our 
attention to a detailed analysis of the selection and experience effects.  
3.1 Selection  Effect 
  To capture the selection effect, as mentioned above, we have created a dummy 
variable “intention to work in government” which is equal to one if the student subject 
stated that s/he intends to work in the public sector and zero otherwise. The coefficient of 
this variable tells us to what extent the strong difference in behavior between the students 
and the public servants is due to a selection effect (as opposed to an experience effect).  
                                                 
21 Gender does not affect the other decisions significantly. We undertake a far more comprehensive analysis 
of the gender differences in the propensities to engage in corruption using a similar experimental set-up and 
data from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore in Alatas et al., (2006) and find that there is a significant 
gender difference in the Australian sample only.   16
  As reported in Table 3, in none of the cases is the behavior of those students who 
intend to work in the government in the future different from the behavior of the rest of the 
students. However, their behavior is very different from that of the public servants. A test 
of equality of coefficients shows that both the bribe and the acceptance rates of the 
students who intend to work in the public sector are significantly higher than those of the 
public servant subjects (p = 0.04 and 0.06 respectively). Thus, the results suggest that 
selection does not play an important role in explaining the differences in the behavior of 
the two subject pools.  
3.2 Experience  Effect 
  We explore four different ways of examining the effect of experience on behavior. 
First, since we find no evidence of a selection effect, the public servant dummy variable 
captures the effect of experience in the public service. Second, we constructed a length of 
tenure variable which captures how important the extent of the experience in the public 
service is. Third, the coefficient on the variable reflecting exposure to corruption in the 
workplace indicates whether experience in a corrupt workplace affects behavior. Fourth, 
the reasons given by the subjects for their behavior shed considerable light on the role the 
public servants’ work experience plays in explaining the behavioral differences between 
the subject pools. 
  Of the first three variables, only the public service indicator is consistently 
statistically significant (Table 3). The length of tenure variable is never significant (and 
hence is not included in the reported regressions). The variable reflecting experience with 
corruption in the workplace is negative and significant at the 10% level in the bribery 
probit (p = 0.10), indicating that working in an environment where one frequently gets   17
exposed to corruption may make one less tolerant of corruption. It is positive and almost 
significant at the 10% level (p = 0.13) in the bribe amount equation, indicating that if one 
has decided to bribe, experience with corruption in the workplace is associated with 
offering a larger amount of bribe.  
  As far as our fourth approach is concerned, the reasons given by the subjects for 
their behavior were in response to open-ended questions. We have grouped these responses 
into the (non-mutually exclusive) categories shown in Table 4, which presents the 
breakdown of such responses by subject pool and decisions. We explore the explanatory 
power of these reasons by reporting the t-tests of differences in means. One of the most 
noticeable differences between the public servant and student subjects is that the public 
servants more often cited experience-related reasons for their decisions – both when acting 
corruptly and when not. For example, significantly more of the public servant subjects than 
the student subjects who chose to offer a bribe did so on the grounds that it was necessary 
given the current Indonesian environment (83% versus 36%, with the difference being 
statistically significant at the 5% level). Further, 46% of the public servant subjects who 
did not offer a bribe stated that they did this to reduce corruption and its associated social 
costs. Such a response was not given by any of the students in our sample. A further 18% 
of the public servants stated that they did not offer a bribe because it is not in the firm’s 
(and the firm’s employees’) best interests in the long run. Only 3% of the students gave a 
similar explanation for their behavior. The student subjects who did not bribe were 
significantly more likely to give simplistic moral explanations. Reasons such as “I did not 
bribe because bribery is prohibited by my religion” were given by 77% of the students as 
opposed to 35% of the public servants.    18
  Looking at the responses of the public servants in the role of the Government 
Official, we find that 43% of them accepted a bribe on the basis that it is either necessary 
for firms to offer bribes and that by accepting the bribe, they will be able to help the 
firms,
22 or that it is necessary given the low salaries of public servants. In contrast, only 
11% of the student subjects who accepted a bribe gave one or both of these reasons.
23  
  Although the sample size for the public servants in the role of the Citizen is very 
small, the patterns of behavior are similar to those found for the subjects in the role of the 
Firm and the Government Official. The two public servants who had the chance to punish 
and chose not to stated that they did not punish because the bribe either is necessary or 
may be for a good purpose. Such a response was given by only slightly more than half of 
the student subjects. Moreover, 40% of the public servant subjects (as compared to only 
27% of the student subjects) who chose to punish said that they did so to reduce 
corruption.
24 
  Another striking difference across the two groups is that the student subjects 
indicated with much greater frequency that they made their decisions to maximize their 
payoffs. 53% of the students in the role the Firm, 62% of the students in the role of the 
Government Official, and 35% of the students in the role of the Citizen gave this reason in 
contrast with 2%, 4%, and 0% of the public servant subjects respectively. All of these 
differences are statistically significant.  
                                                 
22 In Indonesia, as in many developing countries, it can be necessary for a public official to distribute money 
to other officials in order to get forms processed, etc. Hence, by accepting a bribe from a firm, they are able 
to help the firm by distributing the money to other officials as needed. 
23 These figures are the sum of the two categories “necessary for firms to bribe” and “necessary because 
salaries are low.” The difference between this sum for the student and the public servant subjects is 
significant at the 5% level. 
24 Given the small sample sizes for Citizens, this difference is insignificantly different from zero.   19
  These responses suggest that, consistent with the findings in the experimental 
literature, the public servants engaged to a greater extent with the context of the 
experiment. It is also suggested in the literature that the context effect would be larger for 
the public servants when they are in the role of the Official. We do find that the difference 
between the behavior of the two subject pools is the largest in this instance and more 
strongly statistically significant. The acceptance rates are 48.4% lower amongst the public 
servants than amongst the students, whereas the bribery rates are 31.4% lower. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  This paper presents results from an artefactual and framed field experiment 
studying corruption. We find that the Indonesian public servant subjects are significantly 
less likely to engage in corruption than the Indonesian student subjects. We do not find any 
evidence of this being driven by a selection effect in that the behavior of those students 
who desire to work in the public sector does not differ significantly from the behavior of 
the rest of the students. The reasons given by the public servants for either engaging in or 
not engaging in corruption suggest that the differences in behavior across the two subject 
pools is driven by their different real life experiences.  
  The finding that a more direct experience with corruption is associated with a lower 
tolerance of corrupt acts may be explained in terms of the recent institutional changes in 
Indonesia. The advent of democracy and a free press have allowed widespread public 
condemnation of the highly concentrated and visible corruption that was so prevalent 
under President Suharto.
25 The Indonesian public servants may have a lowered tolerance of 
                                                 
25 A consequence of this change of sentiment has been the election of the current government, largely on an 
anti-corruption platform.   20
corrupt transactions due to an increased level of monitoring of potentially corrupt 
activities. Alternatively, all the discussions of the negative impact of corruption on 
economic growth may have led them to aspire to make a positive difference given their 
critical positions.  
The behavioral differences we observe across the two subject pools do not 
necessarily limit the usefulness of experiments that use student subjects. Rather, they 
highlight the need for careful consideration and selection of relevant subject pools, in light 
of the context being studied and the relevance of the subject pool to the policy objective. 
Data from different subject pools can be used to illuminate different aspects of the same 
problem. In the context of corruption, our paper suggests that experimental methodology 
can be used to elicit forward-looking estimates of corruption that indicate a population’s 
propensity to press for and support anti-corruption institutional change.
26 Student subjects 
are more representative of the general population than the subjects drawn from a specific 
profession. In the current context, they are the population that is likely to agitate for policy 
change. A comparison of student attitudes across time or countries can reveal the extent of 
the mood for change (Cameron et al., 2006). On the other hand, public servants are often 
an integral part of the corruption problem and their attitudes are an important, but different, 
component of the difficulty of combating corruption or otherwise of instituting change.  
                                                 
26 Such forward-looking measures may be really important for policy-makers. The most frequently used 
measures of corruption, such as the Transparency International Corruption Index, measure people’s 
perceptions of the extent of corruption in the recent past. See “Digging for Dirt,” The Economist, March 18, 
2006. Several people have raised concerns about the reliability of these measures. See, for example, Olken 
(2006).    21
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Table 1: Subject Pool Characteristics 
 
  Students Public  Servants 
VARIABLES  Mean Mean 
    
Age 20.6  30.5 
Male 0.42  0.75 
Urban 0.89  0.7 
Work Experience (years)  0.36  8.5 
Intention to Work in the Public Sector:  0.19  - 
Weekly Expenditure (Rp)  110534  245711 
Religion:    
Islam 0.664  0.849 
Catholic 0.13  0.041 
Protestant 0.2  0.11 
Hindu 0.006  0 
Ethnicity:    
Javanese 0.49  0.36 
Chinese 0.12  0 
Sudanese 0.08  0.1 
Batak 0.11  0.2 
Minang 0.07  0.06 
Other 0.19  0.28 
Hear about or come in contact with Corruption:   
personally in your workplace  0.09  0.55 
personally outside your workplace  0.33  0.32 
via friends/family  0.52  0.24 
via mass media (TV, newspaper, radio)  0.74  0.57 
no contact  0.09  0.1 
   28
Table 2: T-tests of Statistical Difference 
 
 Students  Public  Servants  p-value 
% of firms bribing  78.3 (N=60)  46.9 (N=49)  0.0005 
Bribe amount (if>0)  7.3 (N=47)  6.65 (N=23)  0.04 
% officials accepting  78.7 (N=47)  30.4 (N=23)  0 
% citizens punishing  0.59 (N=37)  0.71 (N=7)  0.56 
Punishment amount (if>0)  7.4 (N=22)  4.8 (N=5)  0.26 
 Table 3: Regression Results 
 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount  Accept (0/1)  Accept (0/1) 
                      
  1  2    3 4    5 6    7 8   
  M. Effect  p-value    Coeff  p-value    M. Effect  p-value    M. Effect  p-value   
public official  -0.322  0.019  *  -0.85  0.06  #  -0.55  0.005  **  0.59  0.31   
intention to work in govt  0.17  0.39    0.119  0.82    -0.16  0.41    -0.18  0.38   
male  0.36  0.01  *  -0.39 0.32    0.07 0.65   0.11 0.48   
rural -0.16  0.21    0.16  0.71    0.02  0.91    -0.13  0.57   
javanese  -0.17  0.09  #  -0.2  0.56    -0.16 0.26   -0.14 0.34   
corruption in place of work  -0.22  0.1  #  0.76  0.13    -0.05  0.81    -0.16  0.46   
bribe amount              0.06  0.22         
bribe amount*public official                    -0.04  0.6   
bribe amount*student                    0.15  0.034  ** 
                      
Test public official = intention to work in govt:                     
p-values  0.04   0.12  0.06    0.23   
                      
R-squared  0.17   0.13  0.22    0.25   
N  105   68  69    69   
                      
# (*,**) denotes statistical significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. OLS regressions were estimated for the bribe amount and probits for the 0/1 
decisions. 
 Table 4: Reasons for Observed Behavior 
 
    All    If bribe    If don’t bribe   
FIRMS    Officials Students    Officials Students    Officials Students  
Bribe?                   
Yes  necessary given the current environment  0.39  0.28   0.83  0.36 **  0  0  
  for the social/economic good of the country (e.g.  reduce  unemployment)  0.04  0.02   0.09  0.02   0  0  
 payoff  maximization  0.02  0.53 **  0.04  0.68 **  0  0  
  to see the response of the official/citizen  0  0.08  *  0  0.11    0  0   
No  Morality  0.18  0.17   0  0   0.35  0.77 * 
  to reduce corruption (social costs)  0.25  0  **  0  0    0.46  0  ** 
  profit-maximisation (in the long run it is bad for the firm)  0.18  0.03  **  0  0    0.35  0.15   
  not necessary for firms to bribe  0.02  0    0  0    0.04  0   
  Equity  0  0.1  *  0 0.02    0 0.38  ** 
N   49 60   23 47   26 13   
                   
   All    If accept    If don’t accept   
OFFICIALS    Officials Students    Officials Students    Officials Students  
Accept?                   
Yes  necessary for firms to bribe/will be able to help the firm  0.09  0.06    0.29  0.08    0  0   
  necessary because salaries are  low  0.09  0.02   0.14  0.03   0  0  
 payoff  maximization  0.04  0.62 **  0.14  0.78 **  0  0  
  Equity  0  0.06   0  0.08   0  0   
  game will continue  0  0.06    0  0.08    0  0   
No  Morality  0.35  0.06 **  0  0   0.5  0.3  
  to reduce corruption  0.09  0.09    0  0    0.13  0.3   
  scared of implications/risk  0  0    0  0    0  0   
 payoff  maximization  0.04  0.06   0  0   0.06  0.3  
  Fairness  0  0.02 *  0  0   0.06  0.1  
  bribe  too  small  0.09 0    0 0    0.125 0   
N   23 47    7 37   16 10   
                   
   All    If punish    If don’t punish   
CITIZENS    Officials Students    Officials Students    Officials Students  
Punish?                   
Yes  Moral  0.43  0.35   0.6  0.59    0  0  
  reduce  corruption  0.29  0.16   0.4  0.27    0  0  
  fairness  0  0.03   0  0.05    0  0  
 negative  reciprocity  0.14  0.05   0.2  0.09    0  0  
No  payoff  maximisation  0  0.35 #  0  0    0  0.87 ** 
  difficult to change system  0  0    0  0    0  0   
  bribe may be for good purpose/necessary  0.29  0.22    0  0    1  0.53   
N   7  37   5  22   2  10   
# (*,**) denotes a significant difference at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. 